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Abstract 
 
Paying for What You’ll Like? The Uncertain Value of Uncertainty 
 
by 
 
Alice Moon 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Professor Leif D. Nelson, Co-Chair 
Professor Serena Chen, Co-Chair 
 
Risk and uncertainty can be perceived in seemingly contradicting ways. Receiving a surprise gift 
can be exciting, whereas not knowing the outcome of a job interview can be incredibly anxiety-
provoking. Even the same uncertain event, such as gambling, can simultaneously evoke positive 
and negative emotions. When is uncertainty positive, and when is it negative? We find that how 
much people value uncertainty depends on the context, and in particular, how value is measured. 
Namely, when considering pricing measures (e.g., willingness-to-pay), uncertainty is evaluated 
negatively, whereas when considering rating measures (e.g., enjoyment), uncertainty is evaluated 
positively. This effect holds when the outcomes are positive or negative, and even when 
changing the amount of uncertainty, uncertainty remains negative with pricing measures and 
positive with rating measures. We explore possible explanations, such as perceived selling price 
of uncertain prospects, and discuss crucial implications for both theory and applications. 
 
i 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Life rarely works out the way you originally want it to, but in the end, it works out just the way 
it’s supposed to. When I started grad school, I could never have predicted that I would be so 
fortunate to work with such brilliant and caring people. 
 
I would first like to thank my mentor, Leif Nelson, for his constant support, encouragement, and 
inspiration. Leif, as you have guided me to becoming a better researcher and thinker, you 
somehow managed to simultaneously make me feel like I was already a great researcher and 
academic. Thank you for not only teaching me to deeply respect research but also how to have 
fun with it. It is your passion for the field that has fueled my own passion, and I feel truly blessed 
to be a member of the academic community you have built.  
 
I have been lucky enough to have not one but two great advisors, and thus, I would also like to 
thank Serena Chen for her dedicated and attentive mentorship. Serena, I sincerely appreciate 
your hands-on guidance as well as your genuine concern for my personal well-being. You have 
always made me feel like you were looking out for me, and for that, I am grateful. 
 
My dissertation committee was rounded out by two other wonderful professors: Clayton Critcher 
and Iris Mauss. Clayton, your incredible intelligence has greatly developed my thinking, and it 
has been a privilege to work with you and learn from you. Iris, your positivity has been 
invaluable throughout this process, and your feedback greatly improved this paper. 
 
As important as grad school is, life is more than just grad school, and I would not have so 
happily survived had it not been for my amazing family and friends. Mom, throughout my life, 
you have been a perpetual fountain of positive energy and support, and I am immensely thankful 
that you are in my life. I am constantly amazed at how deeply you care for me and love me, and I 
hope that I can repay even a small portion of what you have done for me. To my siblings, Joanne 
and Richard, I love you both so much and I am lucky to have two loving siblings who support 
me, make me laugh, and look out for me. 
 
Last but certainly not least, to all my dear friends, including my fellow grad students, I seriously 
cannot imagine my life without you all. Thank you for being there when I was down, for being 
there when I was happy, for being there when I was angry and unreasonable or any other 
possible emotion. I am nothing without my friends, and I am honored to have you all in my life. 
 
1 
 
Paying for What You’ll Like? The Uncertain Value of Uncertainty 
 
Imagine that you want to go on a vacation. You stumble across an airline that offers 
“blind bookings,” in which the location of the vacation is a surprise to you until the day before 
you leave. It’s likely that this type of uncertainty could produce both excitement and anxiety, but 
how does uncertainty influence preference and value?  For instance, how much would you 
expect to enjoy your vacation, and relatedly, how much would you be willing to pay for this 
vacation? Though this may seem unusual for a business model1, many of our daily decisions are 
wrought with uncertainty. Even trivial decisions, such as what to wear for the day, can become 
complicated by uncertainty about the weather (e.g., whether it will rain).  
When investigating whether uncertainty is good or bad, most research has suggested that 
uncertainty is negative. Uncertainty is normally perceived as fear- and anxiety-provoking (see 
Slovic, 1987 and Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001 for reviews) as well as ego-
depleting (Milkman, 2012) to the point that uncertainty reduction is thought to be a fundamental 
human motivation in various domains (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 1993; van den Bos & Lind, 2002). 
Nevertheless, a small subset of researchers has shown that there can be a positive side of 
uncertainty. For example, Wilson and colleagues (e.g., Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, & Gilbert, 
2005) found that uncertainty can prolong positive emotions because people cannot adapt as 
quickly to an uncertain positive event compared to a certain positive event. 
Although it seems contradictory that uncertainty is both positive and negative, in a 
follow-up paper, Bar-Anan, Wilson, and Gilbert (2009) proposed the uncertainty intensification 
hypothesis, which stated uncertainty intensifies all emotions, both positive and negative. That is, 
when uncertainty concerned positive events, positive emotions were intensified, and when 
uncertainty concerned negative events, negative emotions were intensified. The uncertainty 
intensification hypothesis seemed to explain much of the past literature on uncertainty, giving a 
reason for when uncertainty was positive and when uncertainty was negative. 
However, in 2006, Gneezy, List, and Wu discovered a perplexing phenomenon that they 
termed the “uncertainty effect,” which seemed to clearly demonstrate that people devalued 
uncertainty even when the uncertainty involved only positive outcomes. They revealed that 
people were so risk-averse that they valued lotteries less than their worst possible outcomes. In 
particular, participants were asked to report their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for either: (a) a $50 
Barnes & Noble (B&N) gift certificate, or (b) a lottery ticket that would for sure provide them 
with a reward of a $50 B&N gift certificate or a $100 B&N gift certificate with equal probability. 
Participants were willing to pay around $38 on average for the $50 gift certificate, but 
astonishingly, they were only willing to pay around $28 for the lottery between the $50 and the 
$100 gift certificates. This effect held in both hypothetical and real-stakes scenarios, and 
extended to other goods (e.g., a field experiment with baseball trading cards), and notably, to the 
measure of choice (i.e., choice between the prospect and $25 in cash). Given that the only 
possible outcomes were positive, the uncertainty effect seemed to directly contradict the idea that 
uncertainty is positive with positive outcomes and negative with negative outcomes. 
While various decision-making theories – including expected utility theory and prospect 
theory – differ in the way they propose that people deal with risky prospects, the finding that 
people value risky prospects even less than they do their worst possible outcome violates all of 
these theories. Despite the considerable interest in the uncertainty effect for researchers, the 
uncertainty effect is incompletely understood. Because the uncertainty effect provides some 
direct evidence regarding the value of uncertainty, a greater understanding of the uncertainty 
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effect could help shed light on when and why uncertainty is devalued. Therefore, we review a 
number of the explanations that have been put forth and the relevant evidence: (a) joint versus 
separate evaluations, (b) misunderstanding of instructions, (c) disappointment aversion, (d) bad 
deal aversion, (e) perceived value of the lottery, and (f) direct risk aversion.  
Explanations for the Uncertainty Effect 
Joint versus Separate Evaluations. The original uncertainty effect paper asked 
participants in the certain conditions to evaluate the certain outcomes independently from each 
other. That is, the $50 gift certificate was evaluated separately from the $100 gift certificate. The 
risky prospect of the lottery, on the other hand, always requires participants to evaluate the $50 
and $100 gift certificates jointly. Given that research has found that people devalue lower-value 
outcomes in the presence of a higher-value outcome (e.g., Hsee [1996] found that participants 
were WTP less for a dictionary when evaluated with a better dictionary than when evaluated on 
its own), there is the possibility that the uncertainty effect was due to this difference in joint 
versus separate evaluations. Simonsohn (2009) raised this issue and tested it by asking 
participants in the certain condition to jointly consider their WTP for a $50 gift certificate and for 
a $100 gift certificate. Even when using the joint evaluation version of the certain condition, the 
uncertainty effect was observed. This finding indicates that it is not the difference between joint 
and separate evaluations that accounts for the uncertainty effect. 
Misunderstanding of Instructions. An oft-explored explanation for the uncertainty effect 
has proposed that the uncertainty effect is simply an artifact of participants’ misunderstanding 
what the lottery offers. A participant could potentially interpret the lottery descripton such that 
the chance for the $50 gift certificate and the $100 gift certificate are independent, and therefore, 
there would be a chance to win either of the certificates, both of the certificates, or importantly, 
neither of the certificates. 
To account for this possiblity, Keren and Willemsen (2009) included a true/false 
comprehension check after the lottery description that stated: “It is 100% certain that you will 
win at least 50 euros in terms of a book certificate.” They found that excluding the participants 
who answered this question incorrectly eliminated the uncertainty effect: participants in the 
lottery condition were WTP as much as participants asked about the $50 gift certificate. 
Simonsohn (2009) argued, however, that there were two problems with Keren and Willemsen’s 
(2009) approach: (1) the wording of the comprehension check itself was confusing, and (2) 
adding a comprehension check to, thereby eliminating participants from, only the lottery 
condition and not the certain conditions introduced statistical bias. Simonsohn (2009) introduced 
a new comprehension check which asked, “What was the lowest possible payment the lottery 
could pay?” with multiple-choice values ranging from $0 to $250 in $25 increments. When using 
this comprehension check, he found that 92% of participants answered correctly and none of the 
participants chose $0 as the lowest possible payment of the lottery, which seems to reject the 
idea that participants thought of the probabilities for the gift certificates as being independent. 
Moreover, even when only including those who answered the comprehension check correctly, he 
still observed the uncertainty effect. These findings seem to strongly suggest that 
misunderstanding the lottery does not account for the uncertainty effect. 
In a separate attempt to increase understanding of the lotteries, Rydval, Ortmann, 
Prokosheva, and Hertwig (2009) tried to use physical lotteries to increase participants’ 
understanding of the lottery and found that this eliminated the uncertainty effect. However, in 
addition to this change, they also elicited WTP through a multiple-price list (a list of prices 
increasing in increments was shown and participants were asked whether they would pay each of 
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the prices listed). Simonsohn (in prep) has found multiple-price lists to eliminate the uncertainty 
effect. Though the reason for this is not well-understood, Simonsohn (in prep) conjectures that 
this is because a multiple-price list “facilitates the identification of dominated alternatives and 
induces a more analytical processing of information.” 2 Given that these different elicitations 
have different psychological properties, it is difficult to interpret Rydval et al. (2009)’s results as 
demonstrating that the uncertainty effect is merely due to participants misunderstanding the 
lottery. Still, their findings open the possibility that misunderstanding of lotteries helps explain 
the uncertainty effect. 
Disappointment Aversion. The disappointment aversion account states that people 
devalue the lottery because they do not want to be disappointed by the outcome. Newman and 
Mochon (2012) tested this idea by manipulating the value of the better outcome. If the 
uncertainty effect is driven by an aversion to disappointment, then reducing the discrepancy 
between the better and worse outcomes should reduce the magnitude of the uncertainty effect. 
They replicated the uncertainty effect even when the two possible outcomes of the lottery were 
the same value (i.e., a $50 Barnes & Noble gift certificate and a $50 Borders gift certificate) and 
when the two possible outcomes of the lottery had a much smaller difference in value (i.e., a $50 
Barnes & Noble gift certificate vs. a $55 Barnes & Noble gift certificate).3 These results indicate 
that the uncertainty effect is not driven by disappointment aversion. 
Bad Deal Aversion. Bad deal aversion is the idea that people avoid paying more for a 
product than its market price. Yang, Vosgerau, and Loewenstein (2013) proposed that the bad 
deal aversion account could also explain the uncertainty effect. Specifically, people are willing to 
pay less for a lottery because there is a possibility of getting a bad deal. A bad deal in the context 
of lotteries would occur if people paid more than they would for the worse outcome and 
ultimately ended up with the worse outcome. Though similar to the disappointment aversion 
account, the bad deal aversion account focuses people on their WTP for the worse outcome, 
whereas the disappointment aversion account focuses people on the better outcome. 
While the bad deal aversion explanation has not yet been ruled out, it cannot by itself 
explain why WTP for risky prospects is even lower than that for the worse outcome. It is 
possible that bad deal aversion explains why people choose not to pay more than the worse 
outcome and that another account, such as direct risk aversion or perceived value (described 
below), explains why people pay even less than the worse outcome. 
Perceived Value. Researchers have also proposed that negative associations with the 
word “lottery” may be driving the uncertainty effect. If people associate lotteries with low 
probabilities and/or low prices, this may artificially lower the WTP for the uncertain lottery 
condition to be lower than that of the lowest possible outcome. Contrary to this idea, however, 
Newman and Mochon (2012) asked participants to report their WTP for either a voucher for a 
round-trip coach ticket, a round-trip first-class ticket, or a voucher for a round-trip coach ticket 
that offered a 50% probability of being upgraded to a round-trip first class ticket, and found that 
the uncertainty effect was still observed when avoiding the use of the word lottery. 
 Yang et al. (2013) further investigated whether framing the uncertainty effect in terms of 
a lottery influenced WTP. They found that although the uncertainty effect was observed with 
other risky framings, such as coin flips, gambles, and raffles, they found no evidence for the 
uncertainty effect with riskless framings, such as gift certificates and, surprisingly, vouchers. In 
particular, when framing the risky prospect as either a $50 or a $100 Barnes & Noble gift 
certificate (both equally likely), participants were WTP just as much for the uncertain gift 
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certificate as the lowest possible outcome (the $50 gift certificate). They proposed that their 
effect was potentially due to lotteries evoking different reference prices than gift certificates. 
Interestingly, Newman and Mochon (2012) found that uncertain vouchers produced the 
uncertainty effect, whereas Yang et al. (2013) found that uncertain vouchers eliminated the 
uncertainty effect. Why is it that uncertain vouchers conformed to the uncertainty effect in one 
case but not the other? One difference between the two sets of results is that Newman and 
Mochon (2012) framed their effect as a promotion, which could have been more consistent with 
a risky framing similar to a lottery. However, this idea has not yet been tested. Therefore, the 
notion that lotteries and other risky framings evoke lower reference prices is still viable as an 
explanation for the uncertainty effect. Although Yang et al. (2013) tested both WTP and 
willingness-to-accept (from the point of view of a seller) for different framings of the uncertain 
prospect, willingness-to-accept is motivated by wanting to receive the best possible price for a 
product and therefore, willingness-to-accept may not be the reference price that comes to mind 
for buyers. We revisit this issue in a later study (Study 7). 
Direct Risk Aversion. The default explanation of the uncertainty effect has been that of 
“direct risk aversion” (coined by Simonsohn [2009]). Specifically, people simply dislike 
uncertainty which leads them to devalue risky prospects. This account is consistent with a notion 
pertaining to the utility of gambling (e.g., Conlisk, 1993; Diecidue, Schimdt, & Wakker, 2004) 
and directly addresses the question of the value of uncertainty. The direct risk aversion account 
proposes that risk and uncertainty is devalued. 
While a direct risk aversion explanation is consistent with the literature on the negative 
side of uncertainty, it seems to contradict the idea that people sometimes expect to enjoy 
uncertainty, like in the case of gambling (e.g., Cowley, 2013). In fact, Kurtz, Wilson, and Gilbert 
(2007) found that when people were uncertain about whether they would receive one or two 
prizes at the end of an experiment, they felt happier for longer than when they knew for sure that 
they would receive two prizes. Moreover, Goldsmith and Amir (2010) discovered that 
participants were willing to buy products with uncertain promotions (e.g., buy a Coke and 
receive either 2 Hershey chocolates or a box of Godiva chocolates) at as high a likelihood as the 
best possible outcome (i.e., buy a Coke and receive a box of Godiva chocolates). They posited 
that this effect occurred due to people’s “innate optimistic response” to uncertain promotions. 
Goldsmith and Amir (2010)’s finding differed from the original studies in two significant ways: 
(1) rather than focusing on the purchase of a certain versus uncertain product, they examined the 
purchase of a certain product with a certain versus uncertain promotion, and (2) they did not 
provide information about probabilities of the different rewards (the original effect focused on 
the 50-50 probability for the two possible outcomes). Nevertheless, these findings demonstrate 
that people are not always risk averse, and that risky prospects may, in some circumstances, be 
positive, encouraging hope and excitement instead of fear and anxiety. 
Current Research 
When and why do people value (vs. devalue) uncertainty? The uncertainty effect has 
been shown to be incredibly robust and provides compelling evidence that when assessing WTP, 
uncertainty is devalued. In attempting to reconcile the notion that uncertainty between positive 
outcomes is positive (and uncertainty between negative outcomes is negative) with the 
uncertainty effect (which demonstrates that uncertainty between positive outcomes can also be 
negative), we chose a more direct measure of preference for uncertainty—that of expected 
enjoyment. Past research has shown that different measures of preference (e.g., choice, rating, 
and pricing) can at times reveal drastically different preferences (e.g., Lichtenstein & Slovic, 
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1971; Schkade & Johnson, 1989). Although expected enjoyment is a preference measure that 
overlaps greatly with WTP (e.g., Kahneman, Ritov, & Schkade, 1999), WTP considers many 
other factors that are not necessarily related to preference. Indeed, Amir and Ariely (2007) 
suggested that payment measures consider decision rules, such as the rule that you shouldn’t pay 
to delay positive experiences, in addition to preferences. These results point to the idea that 
though uncertainty appears to be devalued (given that people are willing to pay less for uncertain 
prospects than their worst possible outcomes), people may not actually dislike uncertain 
prospects. In the studies we report here, we uncover an unexpected phenomenon: the value of 
uncertainty is shaped by how preference is assessed. More specifically, when faced with 
uncertainty, pricing measures (e.g., WTP) trigger negative valuations of uncertainty, whereas 
rating measures (e.g., expected enjoyment) trigger positive valuations of uncertainty.  
Study 1 reveals that people anticipate enjoying an uncertain prospect as much as the 
better outcome and significantly more than the worse outcome. Study 2 confirms Study 1 and the 
uncertainty effect in a single study. Study 3 investigates whether changing the parameters of the 
uncertain prospects (i.e., varying the likelihoods of the better and worse outcomes) influences the 
different measures of value. Study 4 extends our findings to negative outcomes. Finally, Studies 
5 – 7 test three potential explanations for our effect: the influence of stakes in valuations (Study 
5), the discrepancy between anticipated and anticipatory enjoyment (Study 6), and the perceived 
selling price of uncertain prospects (Study 7). Compliant with Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn 
(2011), we report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all 
manipulations, and all measures in the studies.  
 
Study 1: Enjoyment of a Certain versus Uncertain Prospect 
 Study 1 explored whether people valued uncertain prospects by testing whether people 
expect to enjoy positive uncertain prospects. 
Method 
 Two hundred and one undergraduates completed a study for course credit.4 
Procedure 
 Participants completed an online survey in which they watched trailers for two movies 
that were premiering one week from the time of the survey. Participants were aware that they 
would all be coming into a movie theater to watch one of the two movies on the day of the 
premiere.5 The movie trailers were for the movies “Friends with Kids” and “Jeff who Lives at 
Home.” The order of the trailers was randomized. After watching the trailers, participants ranked 
the two movies (1 = Movie they wanted to watch more, 2 = Movie they wanted to watch less).  
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Certain (they were 
told which movie of the two they would be watching; i.e., “You have been randomly assigned to 
watch [Movie].”) or Uncertain (they were told that they would find out which movie of the two 
they would watch when they got to the theater; i.e., “You will watch one of the two movies… 
When you get to the theater, the experimenter will randomly assign you to which movie you will 
be watching.”). 
Participants were also randomly assigned to the movie they were going to watch. As a 
result, for those in the Certain condition, some participants would be watching their less 
preferred movie (hereafter referred to as “Good”), and some participants would be watching their 
more preferred movie (hereafter referred to as “Better”). Hence, for this survey, participants were 
essentially assigned to one of three conditions: (1) Good (n = 45), (2) Better (n = 55), or (3) 
Uncertain (n = 101; participants were not yet informed of which movie they would be watching). 
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After this manipulation, participants rated how much they expected to enjoy the movie on 
a 7-point scale (“How much do you think you will enjoy the movie?”; 1 = Not At All; 7 = Very 
Much).6 Therefore, in the Good and Better conditions, participants were asked about their 
expected enjoyment of specific movies, whereas in the Uncertain condition, participants were 
asked about their expected enjoyment of an uncertain movie. 
Results and Discussion 
Participants in the Better condition expected to enjoy the movie (M = 5.18, SD = 1.32) 
more than participants in the Good condition (M = 3.78, SD = 1.54), t(98) = 4.92, p < .001, d = 
.98. 
Surprisingly, participants in the Uncertain condition expected to enjoy the movie (M = 
4.83, SD = 1.29) more than those in the Good condition (t(144) = 4.30, p < .001, d = .74), and 
non-significantly less than the Better condition, t(154) = 1.61, p = .11 (see Figure 1). 
 
Study 2: Enjoyment and WTP Under Uncertainty 
 In contrast to the uncertainty effect, which establishes that people are less willing to pay 
for uncertain prospects, Study 1 offered preliminary evidence that people expect to enjoy 
uncertain prospects. Nevertheless, there are a few limitations of Study 1. One limitation was that 
the 50-50 likelihood of the uncertain prospect was not specified as it was in the uncertainty effect 
studies. Instead, in Study 1, we merely told participants that they would be randomly assigned to 
one of the movies but did not state any likelihood of watching one movie over the other. 
Although the 50-50 chance was implied, this lack of information could have allowed the 
participants to assume that there was a higher chance that they would receive the better outcome. 
Another limitation of Study 1 is that unlike the material products used in previous uncertainty 
effect studies, we used an experiential product (i.e., watching movies). Though there is no reason 
to believe that the difference between material and experiential products should affect uncertain 
prospects in particular, it is possible that people expect to enjoy uncertain experiential products 
whereas people are willing to pay less for uncertain material products. Lastly, although Study 1 
was designed to investigate how uncertainty influences enjoyment, it was an exploratory study 
with other measures and other possibilities for data analysis. Study 2 sought to address these 
issues and to replicate Study 1 and the uncertainty effect in a single study. Moreover, in Study 2, 
participants reported both WTP and expected enjoyment, so that we could explore whether 
uncertainty moderated the relationship between WTP and expected enjoyment. 
Method 
 Three hundred three participants completed an online survey on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk for $0.40.  
Procedure 
Participants watched trailers for two upcoming movies (“Frozen” and “Free Birds” 7) in a 
randomized order, and ranked the two movies in order of which movie they wanted to watch 
more. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of three certainty conditions: Good (they 
were asked about the movie they liked less; n = 107), Better (they were asked about the movie 
they liked more; n = 100), or Uncertain (they were asked about a 50-50 lottery between the two 
movies; n = 96). Finally, participants were asked how much they valued the prospect in two 
different ways. They reported both: (1) their WTP for the prospect, and (2) their expected 
enjoyment of the prospect. The order of the measures was counterbalanced.8 
Measures 
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WTP. In the Good condition, participants were asked how much they would be willing to 
pay for a movie ticket to the movie they wanted to see less. In the Better condition, participants 
were asked how much they would be willing to pay for a movie ticket to the movie they wanted 
to see more. In the Uncertain condition, participants were asked how much they would be willing 
to pay for a lottery ticket that would for sure give them a movie ticket to one of the two movies 
with equal probability. 
Enjoyment. Expected enjoyment was assessed with a single item: “How much do you 
think you will enjoy the movie?” on a 7-point scale (1 = Not At All; 7 = Very Much). 
Participants in the Good condition were asked how much they expected to enjoy the movie they 
wanted to see less. Participants in the Better condition were asked how much they expected to 
enjoy the movie they wanted to see more. Participants in the Uncertain condition were asked to 
imagine being entered in a lottery in which they would for sure watch one of the two movies 
with equal probability and asked to rate their expected enjoyment of the movie. 
Results and Discussion 
 WTP. Participants in the Good condition were willing to pay less (M = $5.14, SD = $3.13, 
Median = $5) than participants in the Better condition (M = $7.94, SD = $3.36, Median = $8; 
t(205) = 6.21, p < .001, d = .86). Replicating the uncertainty effect, participants in the Uncertain 
condition were willing to pay even less (M = $2.56, SD = $2.22, Median = $2) than participants 
in the Good condition, t(201) = 6.70, p < .001, d = .95 (see Figure 2A).  
Enjoyment. Participants in the Better condition expected to enjoy the movie more (M = 
5.58, SD = 1.14) than participants in the Good condition (M = 3.83, SD = 1.54; t(205) = 9.24, p < 
.001, d = 1.29). Replicating our preliminary study, participants in the Uncertain condition 
expected to enjoy the movie (M = 5.34, SD = 1.26) significantly more than participants in the 
Good condition (t(201) = 7.59, p < .001, d = 1.07), and non-significantly less than participants in 
the Better condition, t(194) = 1.40, p = .16 (see Figure 2A). 
 Relationship between Enjoyment and WTP. In light of the discrepancy between our WTP 
and enjoyment findings, we also explored the relationship between enjoyment and WTP. 
Uncertainty moderated the relationship between enjoyment and WTP. We conducted a multiple 
regression with certainty condition (using contrast coding), enjoyment, and their interaction as 
the predictors and WTP as the outcome. We included two contrast codes: (1) comparing the 
Uncertain condition to the two certain conditions (Good & Better), and (2) comparing the two 
certain conditions (Good vs. Better).  
Consistent with previous research, greater enjoyment significantly predicted greater 
WTP, ß = .46, t(297) = 9.47, p < .001. Of primary interest to this study, we found a significant 
interaction between enjoyment and the contrast comparing the Uncertain condition to the two 
certain conditions (ß = .16, t(297) = 3.66, p < .001; see Figure 2B). Specifically, the relationship 
between enjoyment and WTP was attenuated (though still significant) in the Uncertain condition 
compared to the two certain conditions. Furthermore, the two certain conditions did not 
significantly differ in the relationship between enjoyment and WTP (p > .33). 
 Taken together, the results of Study 2 imply that expected enjoyment and WTP diverge 
under uncertainty. These findings indicate that people are averse to uncertain prospects when 
asked about their WTP, yet people prefer uncertain prospects when asked about their expected 
enjoyment. Our results are especially remarkable given that expected enjoyment and WTP both 
intend to represent the broader construct of preference. In fact, WTP is often thought to be a 
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proxy for expected enjoyment (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1999). However, we find that these two 
thereotically equivalent measures are distinct under uncertainty.  
Study 2 also provided evidence against a couple of the remaining explanations for the 
uncertainty effect: (1) misunderstanding of the instructions, and (2) direct risk aversion. If it were 
the case that people mistakenly believed it was possible that they could receive nothing with the 
lottery, people’s responses would also be irrational in the case of expected enjoyment, but 
instead, the uncertain movie was viewed positively with expected enjoyment. If it were the case 
that direct risk aversion explained the uncertainty effect, then people should also feel averse to 
uncertain movies when asked about expected enjoyment. However, people expected to enjoy 
uncertain movies as much as the better movie. Nevertheless, one could argue that risk does not 
exist with expected enjoyment because there are no stakes involved when asking about a free 
movie. We return to this point in Study 5.  
 
Study 3: Increasing Likelihoods of Better and Worse Outcomes 
 Studies 1 and 2 established that people value uncertainty with rating measures (e.g., 
expected enjoyment) and devalue uncertainty with pricing measures (e.g., WTP). In Study 3, we 
sought to investigate the boundaries of the effects of uncertainty. In particular, we changed the 
likelihood of receiving the better outcome (and thereby, the worse outcome), such that in the 
lottery, either the better outcome was much more likely (99% likely) or much less likely (1% 
likely). By including these nearly certain lotteries, we can examine how having even a very small 
amount of uncertainty would influence people’s WTP and expected enjoyment. 
There are several possibilities for how modifying the likelihoods of receiving the better 
and worse outcomes could affect people’s valuations of the different prospects. One possibility is 
that when the probabilities of receiving a particular outcome are very close to certainty, people 
evaluate the nearly certain prospect the same as a certain prospect. In fact, the original 
uncertainty effect paper (Gneezy et al., 2006) found that with both a lottery in which the better 
outcome was nearly certain and in which the worse outcome was nearly certain, the uncertainty 
effect was eliminated: people were willing to pay at least as much as the worst possible outcome. 
Therefore, this possibility would predict that people would be willing to pay at least as much for 
an uncertain movie as the worst possible movie.  
A second possibility is that any amount of uncertainty is treated the same. In other words, 
people may react to the mere presence of uncertainty and may not be sensitive to changes in the 
likelihoods. This second account would predict that people would be willing to pay the same 
amount for all the lotteries and that people would expect to enjoy all the uncertain movies the 
same amount.  
A final possibility is that people may be sensitive to the different likelihoods and take this 
into account when making their evaluations. This final account would predict that when the 
better outcome is more likely, people’s valuations of the uncertain prospect would increase, and 
when the better outcome is less likely, people’s valuations of the uncertain prospect would 
decrease. 
Study 3 was designed to find out which of these explanations was supported, and to 
examine how changing the likelihoods of the better and worse outcomes influenced people’s 
WTP and expected enjoyment. 
Method 
 One thousand six participants completed an online survey on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
for $0.40.9 Procedure 
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Study 3 used a 5 (Certainty: Good vs. Better vs. Uncertain 50% vs. Uncertain 1% vs. 
Uncertain 99%) x 2 (Value: WTP vs. Enjoyment) between-subjects design. The procedure and 
materials were the same as Study 2 with two exceptions: (1) we used new trailers (the movies 
were “Big Hero 6” and “Penguins of Madagascar”), and (2) in addition to the 3 conditions in 
Study 2 (Good: n = 200; Better: n = 205; Uncertain 50%: n = 201), we included two additional 
conditions: Uncertain 1% (participants were asked about a lottery in which the better outcome 
was 1% likely and the worse outcome was 99% likely; n = 201), and Uncertain 99% (a lottery in 
which the better outcome was 99% likely and the worse outcome was 1% likely; n = 199). To 
differentiate between the new conditions, the original Uncertain condition will from hereon be 
referred to as Uncertain 50%. 
Results and Discussion 
WTP. Participants in the Good condition were willing to pay less (M = $5.77, SD = $4.65, 
Median = $5) than participants in the Better condition (M = $8.06, SD = $3.58, Median = $8; 
t(403) = 5.56, p < .001, d = .55). Replicating the uncertainty effect, participants in the Uncertain 
50% condition were willing to pay even less (M = $3.75, SD = $2.93, Median = $3) than 
participants in the Good condition, t(399) = 5.21, p < .001, d = .52. 
Central to the purpose of this study, WTP showed a linear pattern with increasing 
likelihood of obtaining the better outcome. Participants in the Uncertain 1% condition were 
willing to pay marginally less (M = $3.06, SD = $4.62, Median = $1) than those in the Uncertain 
50% condition (t(400) = 1.79, p = .07, d = .18), and significantly less than participants in the 
Good condition, t(399) = 5.85, p < .001, d = .58. 
Participants in the Uncertain 99% condition were willing to pay (M = $5.93, SD = 
$22.29, Median = $5) marginally more than those in the Uncertain 1% condition, t(398) = 1.79, p 
= .07, d = .18, and non-significantly more than participants in the Uncertain 50% condition, 
t(398) = 1.37, p = .17. Participants in the Uncertain 99% condition also did not differ in their 
WTP from the participants in the Good condition, t(397) = .10, p = .92 (see Figure 3). 
Enjoyment. Participants in the Better condition expected to enjoy the movie more (M = 
5.75, SD = 1.28) than participants in the Good condition (M = 4.18, SD = 1.63; t(403) = 10.80, p 
< .001, d = 1.07). Replicating Study 1, participants in the Uncertain 50% condition expected to 
enjoy the movie (M = 5.20, SD = 1.24) significantly more than participants in the Good condition 
(t(399) = 7.05, p < .001, d = .70). Unlike Study 1, participants in the Uncertain 50% condition 
expected to enjoy the movie significantly less than participants in the Better condition, t(400) = 
4.40, p < .001, d = .44. 
As with WTP, expected enjoyment showed a linear pattern with increasing likelihood of 
obtaining the better outcome. Participants in the Uncertain 1% condition expected to enjoy the 
movie more (M = 4.76, SD = 1.60) than participants in the Good condition (t(399) = 3.60, p < 
.001, d = .36), but less than participants in the Uncertain 50% condition (t(400) = 3.08, p = .002, 
d = .31). Participants in the Uncertain 99% condition expected to enjoy the movie more (M = 
5.89, SD = 1.23) than participants in the Uncertain 50% condition (t(398) = 5.59, p < .001, d = 
.56) and just as much as those in the Better condition, t(402) = 1.12, p = .26 (see Figure 3).  
Collectively, these results demonstrate that both expected enjoyment and WTP were 
sensitive to changes in the likelihoods of the better and worse outcomes. Increasing the 
likelihood of the better outcome (Uncertain 99% condition) increased WTP and decreasing the 
likelihood of the better outcome (Uncertain 1% condition) decreased expected enjoyment. 
Nonetheless, though both expected enjoyment and WTP were sensitive to changes in likelihoods, 
people always expected to enjoy uncertain prospects more than the worse outcome, but at the 
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same time, people were WTP less for uncertain prospects than the worse outcome except when 
the better outcome was near certain as in the case of the Uncertain 99% condition. Furthermore, 
the Uncertain 99% condition, which asked about a prospect in which the better outcome was 
nearly certain, reached as high as the better outcome for expected enjoyment, but only reached as 
high as the worse possible outcome for WTP. 
 
Study 4: Expected Dislike and Compensation Demanded With Negative Outcomes 
 Studies 1 – 3 focused on uncertainty in the realm of positive outcomes. In doing so, the 
previous studies allowed us to examine the aversiveness of uncertainty itself. Nevertheless, by 
examining the negative domain (i.e., expected dislike and compensation demanded for two 
negative possible outcomes), we would learn more about how these effects are operating. Thus, 
Study 4 was designed to determine whether uncertainty is always positive with rating measures 
and always negative with pricing measures. 
Specifically, for expected dislike (i.e., a rating measure comparable to expected 
enjoyment in the positive domain), we would learn: (a) whether rating measures always elicit 
hope (i.e., people always assume that they will receive the better option regardless of the valence 
of the possible outcomes), or (b) whether rating measures of value always tends toward the more 
extreme outcome under uncertainty (i.e., people assume that they will receive the better option 
when the possible outcomes are positive, but assume that they will receive the worse option 
when the possible outcomes are negative). 
For compensation demanded, we would learn: (a) whether pricing measures always elicit 
fear (i.e., compensation demanded for the uncertain prospect would exceed the compensation 
demanded for the worse of two negative possible outcomes), or (b) whether fear is not due to 
pricing itself, but due to the idea of payment and spending your own money (i.e., compensation 
demanded for the uncertain prospect would display a more rational response). 
Method 
Six hundred two participants completed an online survey on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
for $0.15. Procedure 
Study 4 used a 3 (Certainty: Bad vs. Worse vs. Uncertain) x 2 (DV: Dislike vs. 
Compensation Demanded) between-subjects design. Participants were asked to imagine that they 
worked in a dormitory where the tasks rotate between the workers. In the Bad condition, 
participants were asked about the task of washing dishes for 20 people who ate at the dormitory 
cafeteria. In the Worse condition, participants were asked about the task of cleaning three stalls 
in a dormitory bathroom after a weekend of use. These tasks were adapted from McGraw, Shafir, 
and Todorov (2010), and we expected that cleaning the bathroom stalls would be worse than 
washing dishes. In the Uncertain condition, participants were asked about a lottery between the 
two tasks in which they would for sure be assigned to one of the two tasks with equal 
probability. Participants were randomly assigned to report either: (a) how much they would 
dislike the task, or (b) how much they would have to be paid to complete the task (compensation 
demanded). 
Measures 
Dislike. Participants rated how much they expected to dislike the task using a single item: 
“How much do you think you will dislike your task?” on a 11-point scale (1 = Not At All; 11 = 
Very Much). 
Compensation demanded. In the Bad and Worse conditions, participants were asked how 
much they would have to be paid to complete the task. In the Uncertain condition, participants 
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were asked how much they would have to be paid to be entered in a lottery which would assign 
them to one of the two tasks with equal probability. 
Results and Discussion 
 Dislike. As expected, participants expected to dislike the Worse task (M = 9.21; SD = 
2.89) significantly more than they expected to dislike the Bad task (M = 7.61, SD = 2.93), t(199) 
= 3.90, p < .001, d = .55. 
 Consistent with the previous studies, participants expected to dislike the uncertain task 
(M = 8.11; SD = 2.13) significantly less than participants expected to dislike the Worse task, 
t(200) = 3.08, p < .001, d = .43, and non-significantly more than the Bad task, t(199) = 1.38, p = 
.17 (see Figure 4). That is, participants expected that an uncertain prospect would not be as bad 
as the worst outcome. 
 Compensation demanded. There was an extreme outlier in the Worse condition (z-score = 
9.95; demanded to be paid $200,000 to complete the worse task). Including the outlier, 
participants needed to be paid non-significantly more to complete the Worse task (M = $2171.62, 
SD = $19884.22, Median = $100) than to complete the Bad task (M = $34.31, SD = $60.01, 
Median = $20), t(199) = 1.08, p = .28. Participants demanded to be non-significantly to complete 
the Worse task than to be entered into a lottery between the two tasks (Uncertain condition; M = 
$562.53, SD = $1645.85, Median = $100), t(198) = .80, p = .42. 
When excluding the outlier in the Worse condition, as expected, participants needed to be 
paid significantly more to complete the Worse task (M = $193.34, SD = $330.46, Median = 
$100) than to complete the Bad task, t(198) = 4.74, p < .001, d = .67. Moreover, consistent with 
WTP in the positive domain, participants demanded to be paid more to be entered into a lottery 
between the two tasks than to complete the Worse task, t(197) = 2.20, p = .03, d = .31. (see 
Figure 4).  
 These results suggest that uncertainty is positive when elicited through rating measures 
(i.e., expected enjoyment and dislike), regardless of the valence of the possible outcomes. On the 
other hand, uncertainty is negative when elicited through pricing measures (i.e., WTP and 
compensation demanded), regardless of whether they require payment on behalf of the person or 
not. Why is it that uncertainty is devalued with WTP but valued with expected enjoyment? 
Studies 5 – 7 were designed to test three different possible explanations. 
 
Study 5: Adding Stakes in Enjoyment 
In the studies we presented so far, the expected enjoyment findings are devoid of any 
investment in that participants in the Uncertain conditions are asked to imagine being entered 
into a lottery without any investment. It is possible that people value uncertain prospects that do 
not contain an element of potential loss (as with expected enjoyment in the previous studies) and 
devalue uncertain prospects that do contain an element of potential loss (as with WTP in the 
previous studies). This begs the question of whether expected enjoyment allows people to have 
hope simply because they have no stakes in the outcome of the uncertain prospect. Study 4 was 
designed to test this explanation by examining whether adding stakes would influence how much 
people expected to enjoy an uncertain prospect compared to a certain one. 
Method 
Three hundred four participants completed an online survey on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk for $0.40. 
Procedure 
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Study 5 used a 3 (Certainty: Good vs. Better vs. Uncertain) x 2 (Stakes: Original vs. 
Payment Information) between-subjects design. The procedure and materials were the same as 
Study 2 with three exceptions: (1) we used new trailers (the movies were “3 Days to Kill” and 
“Non-Stop”), (2) we added an additional factor of Stakes in which half of the participants were 
first asked to imagine having paid $7 for the prospect (Payment Information condition), and (3) 
participants were only asked to report their expected enjoyment because the objective of this 
study was to examine whether including this factor of Stakes influenced how much uncertain 
prospects were valued. 
If investment was the key reason for the effect of uncertainty on enjoyment, we would 
expect that for those in the Payment Information conditions, participants’ enjoyment of the 
Uncertain prospect would no longer be significantly higher than participants’ enjoyment of the 
Good prospect. 
Results and Discussion 
There was a main effect of Certainty, F(2, 298) = 26.32, p < .001. Participants in the 
Better condition expected to enjoy the movie more (M = 5.54, SD = 1.40) than participants in the 
Good condition (M = 4.09, SD = 1.50), t(202) = 7.19, p < .001, d = 1.01. Replicating our 
previous studies, participants in the Uncertain condition expected to enjoy the movie (M = 5.19, 
SD = 1.55) significantly more than participants in the Good condition (t(201) = 5.16, p < .001, d 
= .72), and marginally less than participants in the Better condition (t(199) = 1.71, p = .09). 
There was also a main effect of Stakes, F(1, 298) = 5.09, p = .03, d = .28. Having stakes 
in the prospect (Payment Information condition) decreased expected enjoyment of the movie (M 
= 4.71, SD = 1.68) compared to the Original condition (M = 5.16, SD = 1.50). 
Most importantly, there was no interaction between Certainty and Stakes, F(2, 298) = .25, 
p = .78 (see Figure 5). That is, having stakes involved did not change the pattern of results with 
expected enjoyment: participants still expected to enjoy the Uncertain prospect more than the 
Good prospect. Thus, even when having an investment in the prospect, uncertainty is still 
positive with expected enjoyment. This provides stronger evidence that direct risk aversion 
cannot fully account for the uncertainty effect, because when measuring value with expected 
enjoyment, people are not risk-averse. 
 
Study 6: Anticipated versus Anticipatory Emotion 
Past literature has noted that there is a crucial difference between anticipated emotion 
(the positive emotion that people predict they will feel when experiencing the positive outcome) 
and anticipatory emotion (the negative emotion that people feel in response to risk; see 
Loewenstein et al., 1999 for a review). Perhaps we find a discrepancy between enjoyment and 
WTP because in our studies, enjoyment clearly measures anticipated emotion, whereas WTP 
may instead be reflecting people’s anticipatory emotion. 
Study 6 attempted to address this issue by resolving uncertainty at different times, either 
resolving uncertainty immediately or delaying it for a month. By resolving uncertainty 
immediately, we decrease the length of time in which people would feel an anticipatory emotion, 
such as dread and anxiety. Thus, if WTP is driven by anticipatory emotion, we would expect that 
people would be willing to pay more for an uncertain prospect when the uncertainty is resolved 
immediately rather than resolved at a later time. 
Method 
Three hundred ninety-one participants completed an online survey on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk for $0.10.10 
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Procedure 
Study 6 included 5 conditions altogether, according to a 2 (Certainty: Certain vs. 
Uncertain) x 2 (Receive: Now vs. Later) between-subjects factorial design, with an additional 
Uncertain condition (Uncertain Resolve Now condition) in which participants were asked about 
an uncertain prospect that they would receive later but would find out the outcome of now.  
Participants were asked to report their WTP for a prospect. In the Certain condition, 
participants were asked about their WTP for a $50 Barnes & Noble gift card. In the Uncertain 
condition, participants were asked about their WTP for a lottery that would for sure give them 
either a $50 Barnes & Noble gift card or a $100 Barnes & Noble gift card with equal probability. 
Because the main purpose of this study was to examine whether resolving uncertainty 
now or later would alter people’s WTP, there was an an Uncertain Resolve Now condition in 
which participants would receive the outcome of the lottery a month later but find out the 
outcome of the lottery now, and an Uncertain Later condition in which participants would 
receive a lottery ticket a month later at which point they would find out the outcome of the 
lottery. To ensure that the uncertainty effect held when there was a delay in when the outcomes 
were received, we included a Certain Later condition in which participants were asked about 
certain gift card that they would receive later. Finally, to disentangle the effects of receiving an 
outcome now versus resolving uncertainty now, we included both a Certain Now condition in 
which participants would receive a certain gift card now and a Uncertain Now condition in 
which participants would receive a lottery now and resolve the uncertainty now. 
Hence, the five conditions were: Certain Now (receive certain gift card now), Uncertain 
Now (receive outcome now and find out outcome of lottery now), Certain Later (receive certain 
gift card later), Uncertain Later (receive outcome later and find out outcome of lottery later), and 
Uncertain Resolve Now (receive outcome later but find out outcome of lottery now).  
Results and Discussion 
Replicating the uncertainty effect, people were willing to pay less for the lottery than for 
(M = $21.21, SD = $18.89) than for the certain $50 gift card (M = $34.92, SD = $13.30), F(1, 
310) = 57.97, p < .001, d = .84. Demonstrating a temporal discounting effect, people were 
willing to pay less for a prospect that they would receive one month later (M = $24.01, SD = 
$15.61) than for a prospect that they would receive now (M = $32.11, SD = $18.69), F(1, 310) = 
19.69, p < .001, d = .47. There was no interaction between the Certainty and Receive factors, 
F(1, 310) = .83, p = .36.  
Focusing on the critical comparisons (see Figure 6), both participants in the Uncertain 
Later condition (M = $16.42, SD = $14.87, Median = $10) and participants in the Uncertain 
Resolve Now condition (M = $19.60, SD = $18.99, Median = $10) were WTP less than 
participants in the Certain Later condition (M = $31.69, SD = $12.29, Median = $30), t(153) = 
6.96, p < .001, d = 1.12, and t(152) = 4.69, p < .001, d = .76, respectively. Most notably, we 
found that there was no added utility of resolving the uncertainty sooner rather than later. 
Specifically, there was no difference in WTP between the Uncertain Later and the Uncertain 
Resolve Now conditions, t(153) = 1.16, p = .25. This provides evidence that our effect was not 
merely reflecting the discrepancy between anticipated emotion  in enjoyment versus people’s 
anticipatory emotion in WTP. 
 
Study 7: Perceived Value 
Why is it that people are seemingly irrational in their WTP? One potential explanation is 
that people may simply have a low reference point of how much they think uncertain prospects 
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are worth. Indeed, Yang et al. (2013) suggested this possibility as an explanation in their 
uncertainty effect paper. They proposed that under uncertainty, buyers have a lower reference 
point in their WTP, whereas sellers have a higher reference point in their willigness-to-accept. 
However, as sellers, people may be motivated to sell products at a higher price than the actual 
value. Therefore, in Study 7, we tested whether people actually perceive uncertain prospects as 
being of lower value by asking people about how much they believed prospects were sold for. 
Method 
Five hundred two participants completed an online survey on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
for $0.15.11 
Procedure 
Study 7 used a 2(Certainty: Certain vs. Uncertain) x 2(Perceived Worth: WTP vs. 
Perceived Selling Price) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the two certainty conditions and asked to report either: (1) how much they would be willing to 
pay for the prospect, or (2) how much they thought the prospect would be sold for by the 
company.  
Measures 
WTP. In the Certain condition, participants were told that Whole Foods was selling a $50 
gift card. Participants were asked to report the highest amount they would be willing to pay for a 
$50 Whole Foods gift card. In the Uncertain condition, participants were told that Whole Foods 
was selling a lottery ticket that would for sure give them either a $50 Whole Foods gift card or a 
$100 Whole Foods gift card with equal probability. Participants were asked to report the highest 
amount they would be willing to pay for this lottery ticket. 
Perceived Selling Price. In the Certain condition, participants were again told that Whole 
Foods was selling a $50 gift card. Participants were asked to report how much they thought 
Whole Foods would sell this gift card for. In the Uncertain condition, participants were told that 
Whole Foods was selling a lottery ticket that would for sure give them either a $50 Whole Foods 
gift card or a $100 Whole Foods gift card (with equal probability. Participants were asked to 
report how much they thought Whole Foods would sell this lottery ticket for. 
Results and Discussion 
There was a main effect of Certainty, F(1, 498) = 24.29, p < .001, d = .43. Participants in 
the Uncertain condition reported lower prices for the lottery (M = $36.38, SD = $27.45) than for 
the Certain gift card (M = $45.22, SD = $8.75). There was also a main effect of Perceived Worth, 
F(1, 498) = 19.45, p < .001, d = .39. Participants’ WTP was lower (M = $36.84, SD = $18.19) 
than participants’ perceived selling price (M = $44.76, SD = $22.52). Importantly, there was no 
interaction between Certainty and Perceived Worth, F(1, 498) = .32, p = .57 (see Figure 7). 
This advances the idea that the uncertainty effect occurs because uncertain prospects 
evoke different reference prices – namely, perceived selling price. If people believe that 
uncertain products are sold for a lower price than the worst outcome, then it is rational to be 
WTP less for the uncertain product than the worst outcome as well. 
 
General Discussion 
Uncertainty gives rise to a multitude of reactions, both positive (hope, excitement) and 
negative (fear, anxiety). When faced with uncertainty, which response prevails? Across several 
experiments, we found that people’s responses to uncertainty depend on how the evaluation is 
measured. Specifically, with pricing tasks (i.e., WTP), people devalue uncertainty, thereby 
willing to pay less for an uncertain prospect than the worst possible outcome. Conversely, with 
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rating tasks (i.e., expected enjoyment), people value uncertainty, expecting to enjoy the uncertain 
prospect more than the worst possible outcome. Put another way, with uncertain prospects, 
people appear to be irrational when they reporting value with pricing measures, but display 
rational responses when reporting value with rating measures. These effects are sensitive to 
changes in likelihoods of better and worse outcomes (Study 3), and hold in the negative domain 
(Study 4), such that people demand to be compensated more for an uncertain prospect than the 
worst possible outcome, but expect to dislike the uncertain prospect less than the worst possible 
outcome. Moreover, the discrepancy between pricing and rating measures is not explained by a 
lack of information about payment with rating measures (Study 5), nor is it explained by the 
difference between anticipated versus anticipatory emotions (Study 6). There was compelling 
evidence that perceived selling price provides a reference point for pricing measures (Study 7). 
This could explain why WTP for uncertain prospects is low while rating measures, which should 
be unaffected by this reference point, for uncertain prospects is high. 
Implications 
The present research helps elucidate when uncertainty is valued or devalued. For 
instance, in the medical field, people are often reluctant to undergo genetic testing to find out 
whether they are susceptible to an incurable disease, such as Huntington’s disease (e.g., Quaid & 
Morris, 1993). Our findings could help explain why people may avoid learning whether they 
have or are carriers for diseases such as Huntington’s. Specifically, in Study 4, we found that 
people dislike uncertain negative prospects significantly less than they dislike the worst 
outcomes. In the same way, people may expect to dislike the worse news of being a carrier more 
than they dislike the uncertainty of whether they are a carrier or not. On the positive side, for 
expectant parents, our research suggests that people will more positively anticipate their baby 
when there is uncertainty – for example, about the gender of the baby. However, in the case of 
surrogacy, it is likely that people would be willing to pay less for a surrogate baby when they 
don’t know the gender of the baby. 
An important theoretical implication of this work concerns WTP (and other pricing 
measures) as a measure of preference. WTP is a complex measure that takes multiple factors into 
consideration (e.g., Amir & Ariely, 2007), including reference prices, one’s own valuation, and 
subjective probabilities. Although WTP allows researchers to put a face-valid economic value on 
people’s preferences, the noisiness of the measure can often be problematic. Our research 
suggests that not only is WTP a noisy measure, but WTP is sensitive to a host of factors that 
obscure people’s actual preferences and at times, can even erroneously appear to be a reflection 
of irrational preferences. When attempting to measure people’s valuations and preferences, more 
direct measures of preference, such as rating measures, may be more accurate reflections of 
people’s preferences and exhibit more rational patterns of preference. Nevertheless, pricing 
measures are still useful for determining purchase behavior. One interesting avenue for future 
research could examine what the differential consequences of these various measures of value 
predict. It is possible that expected enjoyment influences willingness-to-participate in uncertain 
promotions but that WTP influences purchase decisions of uncertain products. Given the 
prevalence of uncertain prospects in everyday life, future research should investigate the 
consequences of these different valuations of uncertainty. 
Related Phenomena 
Disjunction effect. Tversky and Shafir (1992) found that when faced with uncertainty, 
people make different choices than when faced with any sure outcome. For example, when 
deciding on whether or not to go on a vacation after an exam, a student may choose not to go on 
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that vacation when they don’t know whether they passed or failed that exam. However, if that 
person knew for sure that they passed the exam, they would choose to go on vacation to 
celebrate, and if that person knew for sure that they failed the exam, they would also choose to 
go on vacation but in this case, to cheer themselves up. Because the act of thinking through the 
consequences of the different outcomes is difficult, under uncertainty, people fail to recognize 
that they would go on the vacation no matter what the outcome. Similar to the disjunction effect, 
the uncertainty effect illustrates that people are willing to pay less for an uncertain prospect than 
any of the possible outcomes, which could suggest that people pay less for the uncertain prospect 
simply because people do not like to think through possibilities in the face of uncertainty. 
However, contrary to that explanation, we find that people are not entirely irrational, because 
they are sensitive to likelihoods of the different outcomes (Study 3), which shows that do process 
information even under uncertainty. Moreover, even if people did not think through the 
possibilities of uncertain prospects, there is no reason to believe that people would be influenced 
by uncertainty in opposing ways for WTP and expected enjoyment, which gives us reason to 
believe that the disjunction effect does not account for our results. 
 Preference reversals. People have been found to exhibit inconsistent preferences with 
regards to risky prospects (called “preference reversals”; e.g., Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971). The 
classic example demonstrated that when evaluating two different gambles: (1) a gamble with a 
high probability of winning a small outcome (high-probability gamble), and (2) a gamble with a 
low probability of winning a large outcome (large-outcome gamble), participants report that they 
would choose to play the high-probability gamble over the large-outcome gamble, but for the 
same set of gambles, the same participants report willing to pay more for the large-outcome 
gamble than the high-probability gamble. This occurs because when people make choices, 
probabilities of winning and losing are weighted more heavily, whereas when people make 
pricing estimates, outcomes are weighted more heavily. Consequently, pairs of gambles exist in 
which people will choose one gamble but will assign a higher price for the other gamble. Though 
our effects are between-subjects (i.e., participants do not evaluate both the certain and uncertain 
prospects), our findings provide additional evidence that preferences are constructed by 
demonstrating another context in which people’s preferences diverge. 
Cognition versus affect. Although we provided evidence that WTP may be driven by the 
salient reference price of perceived selling price (Study 7), there are other differences between 
WTP and expected enjoyment that could also account for the discrepancies in the value of 
uncertain prospects. One such difference is that WTP is a more cognitive measure, whereas 
expected enjoyment is a more affective measure. This distinction is similar to ones made in the 
past literature, such as: affect-poor versus affect-rich and monetary versus nonmonetary. 
Research has found that people are more rational with regards to affect-poor gambles than affect-
rich measures (i.e., they are more sensitive to probability information with affect-poor gambles; 
Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). Similarly, monetary gambles are more sensitive to probability 
information than nonmonetary gambles (McGraw et al., 2010). Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) 
suggest that these types of findings occur because people arrive at their valuation of a prospect 
by different processes: valuation by calculation or valuation by feeling. Though these studies 
focused on different types of outcomes rather than on different types of elicitation methods, one 
could predict that our findings match up with these distinctions. However, the findings we report 
here do not align with these distinctions. We found that people were irrational with WTP but 
rational with expected enjoyment. Furthermore, expected enjoyment displayed a clearer pattern 
of sensitivity to probability information than WTP. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
There are several opportunities for future research. First, because we never specified 
which movie participants in the Uncertain condition would be watching, it is unclear what 
participants in this condition were responding to when they reported their expected enjoyment. 
One possibility is that participants substituted this question with the question of how much they 
enjoy movies in general. We believe this is unlikely given that: (a) participants watch trailers of 
the two possible movies before providing their ratings and in the case of Study 1, they know they 
will actually watch one of the two possible movies, and (b) in Study 3, we found that participants 
are sensitive to the changes in likelihood of the possible movies, which suggests that people do 
not simply respond to the question of how much they enjoy movies in general, a response that 
should be stable. Nevertheless, it is possible that the ambiguity of the question in the Uncertain 
condition caused people to provide ratings that were oftentimes as high as the better movie. 
Second, another difference between WTP and expected enjoyment is that within the 
measure of WTP, there is a question of whether they would like to opt into the prospect. That is, 
people who respond that they would be willing to pay $0 for a prospect are indicating that they 
would choose not to watch the movie at any price. On the other hand, expected enjoyment asks 
the question of whether people expect to enjoy the movie after it has already been decided that 
they are watching. Future research could investigate whether people’s ratings of wanting to 
watch the movie (or likeliness of watching the movie) shows the same pattern as expected 
enjoyment. 
Third, in Study 7, we found that people also expect companies to sell uncertain products 
at a much lower price than the worst possible outcome. Again, if uncertain products are thought 
to be sold at a lower price than the worst outcome, this would provide a rational explanation for 
why the uncertainty effect occurs. This offers a couple opportunities for future research: (a) 
future research should explore whether the reference price of perceived selling price can be 
altered, and (b) in order for people to more positively value uncertainty, future research could 
explore whether framing uncertain prospects in terms of experiences (e.g., expected enjoyment) 
instead of expenditures (e.g., WTP) could allow people to value uncertainty. 
Finally, although we provide evidence that perceived selling price accounts for the 
uncertainty effect, it is unclear whether compensation demanded in Study 4 can be explained by 
the same account. It is possible that people have a rational reference point for compensation 
demanded for uncertain negative tasks as well. However, uncertain negative tasks, such as the 
one we described in Study 4, are uncommon in the real world, and thus, it is less obvious what 
that reference point would be. For an uncertain negative task without a clear monetary value to 
demonstrate an effect parallel to the uncertainty effect with WTP in the positive domain is a 
curious finding that future research should investigate further. 
Conclusion 
The present research provides a major insight into people’s preferences under uncertainty 
that violates assumptions of a prospect’s value. Economists and judgment and decision making 
researchers have worked under the assumption that WTP and expected enjoyment are 
interchangeable measures of value (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1999). However, our studies document 
cases which deviate from this assumption. Complementing the research on preference reversals 
for gambles (e.g., Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971), we find that people expect to enjoy uncertain 
prospects but are less willing to pay for them. We offered evidence that this discrepancy occurs 
because people perceive uncertain prospects as being sold at lower prices. This account 
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recommends that though pricing measures may be invaluable in predicting purchase behavior, 
rating measures may be more informative for revealing people’s preferences.  
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Footnotes 
 
1 Although unusual, this is one way to book flights on Germanwings, a German-based airline. It 
was also the original business model for a couple start-ups, such as getgoing.com. 
 
2 Interestingly, Simonsohn (in prep) also demonstrated that the uncertainty effect remains when 
using multiple-price sequences—that is, when asking about the different prices one-by-one on 
separate screens rather than in a list form. 
 
3 The WTP for these lotteries was less than the WTP for the original lottery between the $50 and 
$100 gift certificates, demonstrating that people are sensitive to the discrepancy between the 
outcomes. Nevertheless, the effect that people valued lotteries less than their worst possible 
outcome remained significant with the equal outcome lottery and the smaller discrepancy lottery, 
which indicates that disappointment aversion cannot account for the uncertainty effect. 
 
4 We attempted to recruit 50 participants per cell in Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5. 
 
5 This pre-survey was the first part of a three-part study. Only the pre-survey is relevant for this 
paper and therefore, the other parts of the three-part study will not be discussed further. 
 
6 In Study 1, we also asked participants two questions after each movie trailer (and prior to the 
manipulation): (1) how much they enjoyed the trailer, and (2) how much they wanted to see the 
movie. 
 
7 Although “Frozen” was ultimately much more successful than “Free Birds,” prior to the movies 
premiering, participants were essentially indifferent to the two movies (about half ranked each of 
the movies as being the one they liked more). 
 
8 Although there was a significant interaction between the certainty condition and the order of 
the measures for both enjoyment and WTP in this study, this interaction was not hypothesized 
nor did it alter the pattern of results that we report. Additionally, this interaction was not 
significant in Study 7. Therefore, we do not discuss it further. 
 
9 Because of the large number of cells in Study 3 (a 5 x 2 between-factors design), we attempted 
to recruit 100 participants per cell. 
 
10 Study 6 was a replication of a study we conducted with slight tweaks. Because the previous 
study did not demonstrate a well-known effect (that of temporal discounting), we increased our 
sample size when running Study 6 to 75 participants per cell. 
 
11 Study 7 was also a replication of a study we conducted with slight tweaks. As in Study 7, the 
previous version did not show an interaction between Certainty and Perceived Worth. Unlike 
Study 7, in the previous study, we found that there was no significant difference between the 
certain and uncertain prospects for perceived selling price. Therefore, Study 7 was a replication 
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with more participants (75 participants per cell) to determine whether there was a significant 
interaction. 
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Figure 1. Expected enjoyment of a certain or an uncertain movie in Study 1. 
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Figure 2A. Mean willingness-to-pay for and expected enjoyment of a certain or an uncertain 
movie in Study 2. 
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Figure 3. Mean willingness-to-pay for and expected enjoyment of a certain or an uncertain 
movie in Study 3.  
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Figure 4. Mean compensation demanded for and expected dislike of a certain or an uncertain 
task in Study 4. 
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Figure 5. Mean expected enjoyment for a certain or an uncertain movie when payment 
information is included (Stakes) or excluded (Original) in Study 5. 
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Figure 6. Mean willingness-to-pay for a certain gift card received one month later (Certain 
Later), an uncertain lottery between gift cards received one month later with uncertainty resolved 
one month later (Uncertain Later), and an uncertain lottery between gift cards received one 
month later with uncertainty resolved immediately (Uncertain Resolve Now) in Study 6. 
  
$0
$5
$10
$15
$20
$25
$30
$35
Certain Later Uncertain Later Uncertain Resolve
Now
W
TP
31 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean willigness-to-pay and perceived selling price of certain and uncertain prospects 
in Study 7. 
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